We study the secrecy capacity of the frequency-selective wiretap channel. Assuming that a guard interval of L symbols is inserted to avoid the inter-block interference and these symbols are discarded at the receiver, the single-carrier frequency-selective channel is modeled as a multiple-input multiple-output Toeplitz matrix. For this special case of the MIMO wiretap channel and under the assumption of perfect channel knowledge at transmitter (CSIT), we propose a practical Vandermonde precoding scheme that transmits the confidential messages on the zeros of the eavesdropper channel. It is proved that this Vandermonde precoding achieves the full multiplexing gain offered by the frequencyselective wiretap channel in the high SNR regime. For a more realistic case where the transmitter only knows the legitime channel we consider the "mask beamforming" scheme where the artificial noise is sent on the zeros of the legitime channel via the Vandermonde precoding. This mask beamforming is shown to achieve the same multiplexing gain as the perfect CSIT.
INTRODUCTION
We consider the frequency-selective wiretap channel where the legitime transmitter sends confidential messages to the intended receiver in the presence of the eavesdropper. Although recent works have characterized the secrecy capacity of the wiretap fading channel for the scalar case [1], the Multiple-Input Single-Output (MISO) case [2] , and Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) case [3] , these works only apply to the frequency flat fading channel. To the best of the authors' knowledge, none has explicitly considered the case of the frequency selective channel relevant to current standards (such as IEEE802.11a type). In order to model the frequency selective channel with L paths, we assume that a guard interval of L symbols is inserted at the beginning of each block of N symbols in order to avoid the inter-block interference. By further assuming that each receiver observes N symbols out of N + L by discarding L symbols, the block frequency selective channel can 978-1-4244-2644-7/08/$25.00 ©2008 IEEE be modeled as a N + L multiple-input N multiple-output Toeplitz matrix 1 • On one hand, it is known that the parallel wiretap fading channels achieve the secrecy capacity which does not scale with the SNR [1] . On other hand, Khisti et al. showed that the capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel grows linearly, i.e. r log SN R where r denotes the effective degree of freedom (to be specified) [3] . It clearly appears that performing OFDM transmission to convert the frequency-selective channel into a set of N parallel flat fading channels is highly suboptimal in terms of multiplexing gain. Moreover to achieve the secrecy capacity of MISO and MIMO wiretap channel in the high SNR regime, the optimal strategy consists of beamforming in the null space of the eavesdropper's channel [2, 3] . Inspired by this strategy, in the case of perfect CSIT, we propose a practical Vandermonde precoding scheme that nulls the eavesdropper channel in single-carrier frequency selective channels. Since the channel of the legitimate and eavesdropper are statistically independent, this scheme provide L (where L is the number of paths) degrees of freedom to transmit secret information. Note that Vandermonde matrices have already been considered for cognitive radios [4] and CDMA systems [5] to reduce/null interference. One of the appealing aspects of Vandermonde precoding is that it does not require a specific secrecy encoding technique but can be applied to any classical encoding schemes. In a more practical case where the transmitter does not know the eavesdropper' channel, we consider the mask beamforming scheme with Vandermonde precoding. The idea here is to send artificial noise on the zeros of the legitimate channel in such a way that L degrees of freedom of the eavesdropper are jammed. Interestingly, in the high SNR regime, L degrees of freedom for the secrecy capacity can be achieved as for the perfect CSIT case.
In the following, section 2 presents the frequency selective wire-tap channel model. Section 3 introduces the Vandermonde precoding both for the perfect and partial CSIT 1The last assumption implies in practice that both the intended receiver and the eavesdropper have the same receiver structure, Le. the eavesdropper is not allowed/capable to modify its receiver. said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of (T, 2 T R) codes for w uniformly distributed in [1,2, ... , 2 TR ] such that the error probability at the intended receiver vanishes and the equivocation rate ;} H (wi z) approaches ;} H (w).
Moreover, the secrecy capacity, the supremum of the secrecy rates, of the block frequency selective channel (1) in bps per dimension is given by [7] The input matrix is subject to the power constraint given by 
T(h)Qu+n
We now consider a more realistic scenario where the transmitter only knows the legitimate channel h. We apply the mask beamforming scheme originally proposed by [11] and analyzed in [3] . Let us form the transmit vector x E eN+L such as
where J-l is determined so as to satisfy the total power constraint L:~=l QiPi = (N + L )P. It is not difficult to see that if~= ... = e the waterfilling power allocation coincides with the equalized allocation (11).
by noticing that T(h)T(h)H is invertible (since all the columns of the Vandermonde matrix are linearly independent
2 ). The last expression shows that the secrecy capacity with the Vandermonde precoding achieves N~L degrees of freedom. D
In order to enhance the performance, we can replace the equalized power allocation (11) by the following waterfilling power allocation. Apply singular value decomposition so that where V h E e(N+L)XL is the normalized Vandermonde matrix that nulls the roots of h with unit-norm columns, 
Q E C(N+L)xN is unitary matrix obtained by the compact singular value decomposition of T(h)
where Ut E e L is the symbol vector with covariance~,
where we letQi = Ilvg,iIl where we defined H = T(h)Vg E e NxL . Although the above secrecy capacity concave in cI> can be optimized explicitly' here we restrict ourselves to a diagonal input covariance. This is sufficient to achieve the multiplexing gain offered by the channel, as we will see below. In particular, we consider the power allocation cI> = diag(Pl' 
Clearly, there exists a constant gap between (19) and ( parameter is inspired by the 802.11 a where we aim at sending the confidential messages over a cyclic prefix. It can be remarked that both the Vandermonde precoding and the mask beamforming achieve the same slope in the high SNR regime. The mask beamforming performs closed to the Vandermonde precoding with equal power allocation especially for N == L. We observe also a non-negligible gain due to the watefilling power allocation for the Vandermonde precoding. The relative merit between these schemes is out of scope of this paper and remains as a future investigation. These numerical examples show that the Vandermonde precoding as well as the mask beamforming are able to exploit the full degrees of freedom offered by the frequencyselective wiretap channel. The Vandermonde precoding with waterfilling power allocation yields a substantial gain with respect to the mask beamforming at the price of perfect channel knowledge at the transmitter.
Lemma 2 The secrecy capacity of the mask beamforming achieves the multiplexing gain N~L. (18) with DV(P) == diag([P, ...P, 1+~Al' ... , 1+~'\L D· In the high SNR regime, the term (18) scales as (N -L) log(P) whereas (17) scales as N log(P). The secrecy capacity of the make beamforming scales therefore as N~L log(P), the same as the perfect CSI case. D where A? are the N non-zero eigenvalues ofT(h)T(h)H.
Next, we consider the scaling of C~bidual(p) as P~00. In this section, we evaluate the secrecy capacity of the proposed Vandermonde precoding as well as the mask beamforming.
For the sake of comparison, we first consider the special case of the MISO wiretap channel where the intended receiver receives a scalar observation while the intended receiver and the eavesdropper have N observations. We average the capacity over a large number of randomly generated channels with N == L == 64. In Fig. 2 , we compare the secrecy capacity with the Vandermonde precoding, the mask beamforming, and the optimal beamforming strategy [8] as a function of P. We observe that all strategies achieve the The secrecy capacity achieved by the mask beamforming is given by 
Cmb(P) = N~L (log lIN + PT(h)T(h)H I-C~bidUal(p))

